What is the position of non-state armed groups in public international law, a system conceived for and by states? This article considers the question, mainly in the light of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It shows that, while armed groups essentially trigger the application of jus ad bellum, they are not themselves endowed with a right to peace. Jus in bello confers rights and obligations on armed groups, but in the context of an unequal relationship with the state. This inequality before the law is strikingly illustrated by the regulation of detention practised by armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. Despite the significant role that they play in modern-day conflicts, armed groups constitute an 'anomaly' in a legal system that continues to be state-centric.
Armed conflicts involving the participation of an armed group are a phenomenon of remarkable significance in comparison to inter-state armed conflicts. They occur more frequently and apparently antedate inter-state armed conflicts in history. 1 International law, which is anchored in a changing world and intended to regulate life in a global society, 2 was long uninterested in such conflicts, 3 essentially because they are governed by the domestic legislation of states rather than by international law. 4 International law is considered a branch of law open to development, 5 but the developments introduced are first and foremost in the interest of states. The latter have recognized no common higher authority. 6 The international legal order presents the state as the entity without which it cannot exist. 7 The state has a firm grip on international law: 'Contemporary international law is clearly the work of states; every last word conforms to their wishes. States jealously safeguard their constitutional attribute of independent sovereignty and thereby affirm their monopoly over both national and international matters'. 8 They are described in several ways for that purpose: as the law's primary, 9 or principal and original subjects. 10 They make and unmake international law. 11 On the face of it, therefore, all entities but the state fall outside the scope of international law.
The development of international law has led to its increasingly broad application in areas considered to be of internal concern to the state. Despite the fact that it is intended to regulate the external affairs of states with each other, it is gradually encroaching on what are in principle internal matters. International law's claim to extend to internal spheres takes little account of what is traditionally considered an area under the exclusive remit of the state, according to the longstanding and classic separation between what falls to states and what lies outside their jurisdiction. Indeed, 'international law has always been pulled between respect for sovereignty and the requirements of international rules . . . Its history can be viewed through the prism of the constant give-and-take between internalization and internationalization'. 12 It is in this context that the question of the application of international law to armed groups and their operations arises.
Armed groups are made up of individuals over whom the state on the territory of which they operate wishes to maintain special control thanks to its internal laws. As such, armed groups do not benefit from the same status as government forces. In internal law, or in the language of the public authorities, the members of armed groups simply refuse to obey the law; they are bandits under ordinary law, terrorists, stateless persons who can be punished for the mere fact of having taken up arms. In international law, no instrument places insurgents on an equal footing with government troops. Armed groups therefore have relatively low status in international law, when it applies. Historically, tangible progress in incorporating situations of internal strife into international law has been incremental. It is true that armed groups, which are more often than not opposed to government forces, are not ordinary non-state entities. The fact that international law has been 'uninterested' in them is not just due to their non-state character. Armed groups are the enemy of the state, which holds the upper hand when it comes to the development of international law.
International law relating to armed conflicts -within which armed groups operate -has two main areas: the body of rules relating to the use of force, jus ad bellum, and the rules applicable in an armed conflict, jus in bello. This article endeavours to situate armed groups in international law from the point of view of these two main bodies of law. We can already say, unsurprisingly, that neither was conceived for armed groups or in the light of their existence. The various dimensions of jus ad bellum remain marked by that initial reality, whereas jus in bello presents a different picture. Still, questions such as the deprivation of liberty highlight the law's shortcomings with regard to armed groups.
Use of force

The right to use armed force in domestic law
There is no jus ad bellum that specifically applies to international law governing non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). As a result, the regulation of the use of force falls to the domestic law of states, which therefore serves as a kind of jus ad bellum. 13 Yet, insurrections are prohibited under domestic law; thus the insurgents will in principle stand in violation of the law. The situation is the same as that between states, but more clear cut. Compared to conflicts between states, there is no subjective equality between the parties before jus ad bellum. 14 In conflicts between states, each state believes that it is in the right and that the other state, the enemy, has violated the law. In domestic law, the situation is less subjective: the law is on the side of the government forces. The armed group's armed operations are conducted within a state; the group is therefore governed by domestic law. In principle, domestic law reserves the use of armed force for government forces. 15 An armed struggle against government forces is therefore by definition a violation of domestic law. This does not preclude the application of international humanitarian law (IHL), which, in turn, works to safeguard the right of the authorities in power to repress the mere fact of having rebelled. 16 Some historical texts nevertheless provide for a right of insurgency. 17 One example is this provision of the 1793 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen: 'When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people and for each portion of the people the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties '. 18 This is a remarkable provision, one that is akin at first glance to the texts adopted in revolutionary processes. However, since the aim of any authority is to keep itself in power, such provisions are rarely implemented in the legal, rather than political or ideological, sense. Any uprising, except when the authorities are manifestly powerless, is met with the repression that it is deemed to deserve.
The right to use force in international law
The prohibition of the use of armed force set out in contemporary international law only concerns states in their relations with each other. It does not concern situations arising within the borders of a state. 19 Thus, the use of force by states on their own 14 François Bugnion, 'Just wars, wars of aggression and international humanitarian law', in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 847, 2002, pp. 523-546; M. Sassòli, above note 13, p. 242. 15 'As the monopoly on the use of force for State organs is inherent in the very concept of the Westphalian State, we may assume that the national legislation of all States prohibits anyone under their jurisdiction to wage an armed conflict against governmental forces or, except State organs acting in said capacity, anyone else.' M. Sassòli, above note 13, p. 255. 16 Additional Protocol II, Art. 6, para. 5. 17 In current constitutional law, certain basic laws provide that citizens have the right to bear arms. Such is the case of the Constitution of Argentina, Article 21 of which provides that Argentine citizens must take up arms to defend the Constitution. In the Tablada case, the insurgents invoked this provision, Juan Carlos Abella v. territory is not prohibited by the international law relating to recourse to force. IHL, for its part, does not deny states the right to fight those rising up against their authority. That is not its purpose. The causes of the fighting and the grounds for using armed force are of no concern in jus in bello. Indeed, it would appear to be in the law's interest to remain aloof from those questions, because conflating them would undermine respect for the law and even its existence. Certain provisions of IHL are phrased in such a way that it can be said that the law leaves the door open to repression of the activities of armed groups. The first such provision -the conclusion of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions -is relatively subtle and reads as follows: 'The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict'. 20 The relevant section of the commentary on this provision states that:
the fact of applying Article 3 does not in itself constitute any recognition by the de jure Government that the adverse Party has authority of any kind; it does not limit in any way the Government's right to suppress a rebellion by all the means -including arms . . . 21
The commentary is thus more explicit than the treaty text. The second provision is explicit about its intent. According to Article 3 of Additional Protocol II, nothing in the Protocol may be invoked to infringe the '. . . responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State'. 22 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) echoes this sentiment. 23 Armed groups are not prohibited under international law from using force against other armed groups or against the government authorities. 24 This statement follows from the general observation that traditional international law, which is profoundly state-centric in ideology, made no provision, in whatever shape or form, for NIACs. 25 Under jus contra bellum, the prohibition to have recourse to force set out in the Charter of the United Nations only concerns international relations. Two comments come to mind here. The first tends to reinforce the idea of a right of insurrection. A national liberation movement (NLM) defending a people against a colonial power may take up arms in pursuit of its cause. 26 Other instances in which the right to 'external' self-determination is expressed by the use of armed force are subject to dispute. 27 The second remark does not entirely contradict the first. Generally speaking, the Charter of the United Nations does not explicitly condemn NIACs: 28 it specifically prohibits the use of force in international relations alone. However, Security Council practice with regard to military intervention in internal situations casts another light on the right of insurrection. The Security Council has on several occasions decided to intervene militarily in a situation of internal conflict. 29 Is this because non-state armed groups may not have the right to rebel or the state to repress them? The intervention may be prompted by the need to prevent violations of humanitarian rules. In that case, the endeavour to respect jus in bello is a means of ensuring respect for a kind of jus contra bellum. The intervention may, in addition, be prompted by the effect that NIAC has on international peace. The Security Council's intervention would thus be justified by its desire to maintain international peace by preserving the internal peace of states. It could then be said that the right of insurrection or to repress an insurrection exists insofar as its enjoyment does not affect jus in bello to the point of compromising international peace. This interpretation seems more to the point than that which consists in saying that the Security Council intervenes in NIACs because they are unlawful. For example, the Security Council has intervened in states (such as Haiti and Sierra Leone) in order to restore democracy, yet it cannot be said that democracy is a universal norm of international law.
What belligerents can call on the intervention of a third state? The classic reply -outside the time-honoured context of recognition of belligerency -is: the states. They are allowed to call on external military aid. Armed groups are denied this right. 30 This was the position adopted by the International Court of Justice in the case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 31 It is authoritative, even though other ideas exist, such as that which allows no military intervention in 'direct support of one of the parties to the conflict'. 32 Article 3, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II does not contradict the Court's position. It prohibits foreign intervention in NIACs against the party called on to defend the state's sovereignty, but it says nothing that would prohibit the government authorities from inviting a state to repress an armed group. 33 Nor is such an invitation prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations. However, can a state call Collective armed action
The system of collective security devised after World War II did not take account of non-state entities. Reality on the ground has obliged both the Security Council and regional arrangements and agencies to consider the situations created by the action of such entities in general and by armed groups in particular. Indeed, in an improvement over the earlier position, the single state-centric purpose of the system of collective security has been replaced by two purposes: peace between states and peace within the state. Peace within the state encompasses peace from the acts of both harmful internal non-state entities and harmful external non-state entities (such as terrorist groups). The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change shares this view, concluding that there exists a wide range of elements that, according to it, constitute a threat to international peace and security and that are inter-state in origin and above all internal to states: 35 'Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security'. 36 This is an exceedingly broad view of the threat to international peace and security. It is state-centric in that it is very generous towards states, placing them in an 'unassailable' class, with international peace and security predicated on their absolute calm. In the main, coercive military action by international organizations in situations of NIAC has been directed at armed groups. In the case of Liberia in particular, the argument that the states of the sub-region (acting through the insurgents) had attacked Liberia was invoked to lend credibility to the decision to apply the 1981 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence. 37 In reality, however, the sub-regional 34 'In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. forces (ECOWAS Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG) were chiefly preoccupied by armed groups. In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS itself justified the transformation of its peace-keeping operation into coercive action by the need for its forces to defend themselves in the face of attacks by armed groups. 38 As far as collective armed action is concerned, international law gives no 'legal weight' to armed groups. It deals with armed groups, not to regulate their activities, but to fight them, to calm the situations they create, or to manage the consequences of their disruptive existence. The right of the state to dispatch armed forces in the name of the United Nations or of regional bodies further weakens the position of armed groups should they contest the law governing collective action with the state. The intervention of other states, and later NATO, in Libya in 2011 is too recent to draw any final conclusions, but its implementation tends to call this statement into question. Indeed, although the intervention air forces backed the Libyan insurgency, to which the individual countries dispatched military advisers, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, in particular resolution 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011, had a more humanitarian bent, namely to protect the civilian population. The resolution's sponsors provided that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
[a]uthorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory . . . 39 and ' [d] ecides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians'. 40 The authorization was not against the Libyan insurgents, but nor was it given, at least in the letter of the resolution, to support them. The insurgents were in favour of international action, bringing to mind the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) in Serbia and Montenegro and the intervention of NATO forces in 1999 (in that case, the Security Council had not authorized NATO action).
Individual military action
Self-defence against action by armed groups Individual armed action for the most part confirms what has been said above. Historically, whether before or after the right to use armed force was limited, selfdefence or anything resembling it has not in principle concerned the action of Z. Daboné -International law: armed groups in a state-centric system individuals through which the state's responsibility could not be discerned. 41 It is on this basis that the view that acts by non-state entities, such as terrorist groups, are basically in self-defence has been vigorously combated. The reaction of the United States of America and its allies in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 has often been seen as lacking a valid self-defence argument, 42 unless the attacks are considered to have been perpetrated by Afghanistan. 43 From the general perspective of non-state entities, it has been argued that there can be no aggression without the involvement of a state. Self-defence having 'clearly been conceived as an exception to the prohibition to use force in relations between states', it cannot be invoked to justify the use of force against individual perpetrators of crimes. 44 According to Maurice Kamto, whether the scope of the prohibition to use force can be extended to the activities of unofficial non-state entities has sparked a lively debate among scholars, who have reviewed the doctrine since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States. The question is easy to answer if one assumes that the entities in question and their armed activities have no connection with a state: it seems fairly clear, in fact, both in view of the interstate nature of the Charter and the tenor of Article 2, paragraph 4, that the rule prohibiting the use of force does not extend to non-state actors. It is impossible, without misconstruing the language, to speak of armed aggression in such a case, or, consequently, to invoke and exercise the right of self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter; there is no need for lengthy discourse on the matter. 45 Kamto goes on to say that the issue of whether the right to use force extends to non-state entities boils down to the nature of their ties with the state and the degree of control that the state has over the entities when they carry out their military operations. In short, a link is required to transform the unlawful activities of non-state actors into state action. 46 Thus, an armed group acting on its own, or any other non-state actor, is unable to commit an act of aggression. That position has not been refuted by the International Court of Justice, which is adamant that the acts of non-state entities must be attributed to a state before there can be any talk of armed aggression (and hence self-defence). Reaffirming the position that it took in the Nicaragua case, the Court recalls in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall that there is a right of self-defence when one state commits an act of armed aggression against another. 47 The problem is that when the Court interprets the scope of Article 51 of the Charter at the same time it modifies its criteria: 48 Article 51 does not stipulate that armed aggression must be the act of a state.
The Rome Statute opted for a classic position on aggression. The Review Conference of the Rome Statute adopted a resolution in Kampala on 11 June 2010 by which it amended the Statute to include a definition of the crime of aggression. The resolution provides that the following text is to be inserted as Article 8 bis of the Statute:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime of aggression' means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. could easily have been another way round. Relations between Sudan and Chad, in particular, have frequently deteriorated in the wake of action by 'foreign' armed groups or armed groups operating from abroad. All this could have prompted the Assembly of States Parties to innovate when it came to the definition of aggression used by the Court. It could have stipulated that the members of an armed group conducting activities comparable to those constituting aggression, by using the armed group's apparatus, were liable to prosecution by the Court. This supposes that the armed group is able to carry out an act of aggression. Africa after the 1990s and post-9/11 has another view of the question of aggression. The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact of 31 January 2005 includes 'the provision of any support to armed groups' in its definition of aggression. 50 It re-examines the position of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua judgment, wherein the Court stated that assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of arms or logistical aid was not an act of aggression. The Pact facilitates indirect aggression by giving greater weight than the Court to support to armed groups by foreign states. 51 The Pact is also interesting in that it goes further than the UN General Assembly resolution 3314 to stipulate that invading or attacking the territory of a state with armed forces constitutes aggression. 52 In contrast, the UNGA resolution is more restrictive when it says that the invasion or attack of a state's territory must be carried out by the armed forces of another state to be an act of aggression. 53 Thus the Pact, in the absence of other details, leaves it to be understood that the invading or attacking armed forces can also belong to an entity other than the state, notably armed groups. 54 The act of aggression is thus no longer indirect but rather a 'private act' perpetrated solely by In fact, and in keeping with the general definition of aggression used, the following acts by armed groups are also considered as acts of agression: use of armed force against a member state; bombardment of the territory or the use of any weapon against the territory of a member state; blockade of the ports, coasts, or airspace of a member state; attack on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and fleets of a member state; acts of espionage that could be used for military aggression against a member state; technological assistance of any kind; intelligence and training provided to another state for the same purpose; encouragement of, support for, harbouring of, or provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent transnational organized crimes against a member state. Under the Pact, the following types of aggression are the preserve of states: use of the armed forces of a member state that are within the territory of another member state with the agreement of the latter, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the Pact; and the action of a member state in allowing its territory to be used by another member state for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state. Armed groups' right to peace Do armed groups have a right to peace? If foreign forces have not been invited by the official government, then their operations are an act of aggression in respect of that government (unless they are acting on the authorization of the UN Security Council). We are best advised to affirm that it is the state that has the right to selfdefence in the face of such forces. Armed groups fighting such forces could be compared to resistance groups but do not appear to have the right to self-defence. If the foreign armed forces are acting on the invitation of the official government, armed groups have no right of self-defence, since they have no right against aggression. In the recent case of the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia reviewed the use of force between the Georgian government and the forces of the separatist province of South Ossetia. While acknowledging that South Ossetia continued to be part of Georgia, the Mission concluded that international law prohibited the use of armed force between Georgia and South Ossetia and that military activities against the separatist province gave rise to a self-defence operation for its benefit. 57 That position does not hold up to scrutiny. It implies what the Charter does not say. It cannot be assumed that the use of force is prohibited between a government and an entity that remains a part of the state concerned (unless that entity is an NLM).
To cite specific agreements between the parties (to the conflict) not to have recourse to force and make the connection to the Charter, as the Mission did, lends itself fairly easily to criticism. The special agreements cannot be deemed to have the same status as the Charter of the United Nations, otherwise the many peace agreements between belligerents in NIACs would all be on an equal footing with the Charter. Since self-defence supposes a prior act of aggression, the implication is that the entity enjoying that right benefits from a minimum of sovereignty (conversely, there is no need to be sovereign to attack). Yet a separatist province is not sovereign. If the armed group in question is an NLM defending a people against a colonial power, the right of that group to self-defence would seem to be on more solid ground. Here, the intervention of foreign states may be construed as violating the right to self-determination. Colonized peoples have the right to use armed force for the purpose of defending their right to self-determination. Logically, therefore, 55 R. van 59 His position distinguishes between the right to use armed force and the right of selfdefence, which apparently ranks higher. It can nevertheless be supposed that, in international law, an entity that has the right to use armed force is entitled to act in self-defence if attacked. In addition, Cassese's views appear to relate more to the relationship between the NLM and the colonial power concerned, for the developing world struggle mentioned above was no less than to reclaim the right to self-defence against the colonial power, which was already clearly present in the territory of the peoples concerned. If we look again at the situation of an NLM confronted by foreign armed forces 'assisting' the colonial power, it would be hard not to consider that the movement is exercising the right to self-defence.
Conclusions on the use of armed force
The attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States rekindled discussion of the possibility of acting in self-defence in response to an operation by a non-state entity. The discussion naturally included the specific activities of armed groups. International law does not seem to have a fixed position on the matter, the African regional texts recognizing armed groups as potential triggers of selfdefence operations. As for the question of whether armed groups are entitled to a right of self-defence, the reply should be affirmative for NLMs fighting the allies of colonial powers. However, such conflicts no longer appear to arise with any frequency. Armed groups basically trigger the application of jus ad bellum. In general, they are not themselves endowed with a right to peace. In limited instances, when they take the form of NLMs, they are entitled to use armed force on behalf of peoples aspiring to independence from colonial domination. Armed groups have a more explicit place in situations of jus contra bellum (thus clearly a right against the use of force) and are set apart from international jus ad bellum (which refers to the 58 'Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter'. UNGA Res. 'mere' regulation of recourse to armed force). However, cross-border armed groups appear to be upsetting traditional assumptions. In all cases, jus ad bellum is profoundly 'anti-armed group'.
Law of armed conflicts ( jus in bello) and related aspects
Is the law of armed conflicts favourable to armed groups?
The existence of international humanitarian rules applicable to situations in which armed groups participate could not always be taken for granted. Armed groups -simple collections of individuals with no military function assigned by the state authorities -were outside the scope of international law, as were the conflicts opposing them to the state. Yet the relations of all states vis-à-vis an aggressor are similar to those between the state and armed groups: they are basically relationships of rejection. 60 IHL is applicable in situations in which a non-state entity is participating only when that entity is of a certain importance. It applies in principle only in the context of an armed conflict, and the existence of an NIAC is also predicated on the importance of the enemy opposing the government forces. But the importance of a belligerent is only examined in the case of non-state entities; it is hardly a matter of concern to international law whether a state, no matter what its importance (surface area, population, military strength, etc.), can wage war. That ability to take up arms (which is different from the right, strictly limited by contemporary international law, to wage war) is inherent in the quality of statehood 61 and not in the quality of a mere group of individuals.
One objective of the promoters of IHL is to attain a uniform system of protection for individuals in all situations of armed conflict. 62 The law of international armed conflicts (IACs) is neither perfect nor complete; rather, it is a body of rules that is meant to evolve as required by the contingencies of the moment. It is nevertheless the model that serves as a reference. The law of NIACs is developing in such a way as increasingly to resemble the law of IACs. Many scholars have written that the trend is strong and the goal in sight, 63 or about the urgency of the task. 64 The study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of customary IHL indicates that the line between IACs and NIACs is on the verge of disappearing. 65 The time has not yet come, however, when IHL can be applied in the same manner in IACs and NIACs. There remains a difference in the rules that can be applied, and that difference can be felt as soon as the discussion turns to the threshold of applicability of the law. Indeed, for humanitarian law to be applicable in an NIAC, a number of criteria must be met, in particular the level of violence; no such criteria apply to armed conflicts between states. 66 States choose to expand the material scope of application of inter-state agreements to situations involving armed groups. They can also expand the personal scope of application by clearly stipulating rights and obligations for armed groups. Even in IHL, where the largest international law concessions have been made to armed groups (in the sense that their status has been raised), states have still generally 67 opted to differentiate between the law applicable in armed conflicts between states and that applicable in armed conflicts involving armed groups. 68 The tendency to close the gap between the legal systems applicable in the two types of armed conflict is more clearly expressed in customary law or jurisprudence, which lies outside specific sphere of nation-states, than in new international treaties. 69 The inequality between the state and armed groups is omnipresent in international law. For a start, legal personality does not exist ex nihilo. The fact that an entity other than the state has such a personality is because the states have so agreed. 70 Thus, such an entity has no more than a derived legal personality. 71 And if the entity in question is an armed group, then it would seem to owe its promotion to the very entity that is usually its enemy. Since international law is historically an inter-state type of law, it is between states that the law's principal and general rules are usually decided. This is not to ignore the influence that non-state entities can have, 72 to make a unilateral declaration by which they undertake to abide by the provisions concerned. In this context, are such declarations unilateral acts or are they part of treaty-based law? For example, the following has been said of the declaration allowed under Additional Protocol I: The effect of this declaration is to trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in the armed conflict in question. As we can see, this is a new form of undertaking in treaty law, by unilateral declaration, yes, but with synallagmatic effects, because the effects, as concerns relations in international humanitarian law between the High Contracting Party and the authority, are identical, for the entire duration of the conflict, to those arising from an accession or ratification. 80 Unilateral declarations made by NLMs are hard to classify among unilateral acts, if only because of the reciprocal effects that they give rise to. Would Additional Protocol I be applicable between a High Contracting Party and an NLM if the movement had not made the declaration? According to the wording of Article 96, 81 the effects are set in motion (and the national liberation movement bound on the same terms as the state) only once the depositary has received the unilateral declaration. In other words, so long as the declaration has not been received, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I do not apply between the movement and the High Contracting Party. This gives the declaration a 'law of treaties' aspect: it is acceptance of an agreement (signature or ratification, as the case may be) that burdens the state with the rights and obligations it sets out. On this point, Additional Protocol I falls short of Common Article 3, which has the advantage of being automatically applicable to any NIAC. But are we in the realm of the law of treaties? The wording of the title of Article 96 -'Treaty relations upon entry into force of this Protocol' -points to a treaty-type functioning. A movement's unilateral declaration is unrelated to the Protocol's entry into force, and is therefore not a ratification. Nor is it appropriate to speak of accession. Accession enables the treaty concerned to enter into force between the acceding entity and the states that are or will be party to it. The movement's unilateral declaration is only effective between the movement and the High Contracting Party concerned by the movement's in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 3, of the said Protocol, and undertakes to apply this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict; or (b) where the High Contracting Party is not a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority of the type referred to in subparagraph (a) above accepts and applies the obligations of the Geneva Conventions and of this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict. Such an acceptance and application shall have in relation to that conflict the following effects: (i) the Geneva Conventions and this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are brought into force for the parties to the conflict with immediate effect; (ii) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols; and (iii) the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are equally binding upon all parties to the conflict. The High Contracting Party and the authority may also agree to accept and apply the obligations of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on a reciprocal basis.' 80 Denise Plattner, 'La portée juridique des déclarations de respect du droit international humanitaire qui émanent de mouvements en lutte dans un conflit armé', in demands. This is not how treaties usually function; rather, it appears to be a new type of special agreement. The special agreements provided for in Common Article 3 allow the parties to the conflict to go further than Common Article 3, which applies automatically, without special agreements. By the same token, Common Article 3 applies to the armed conflict between the movement and the state concerned even if the movement has made no unilateral declaration. However, unilateral declarations can serve to go further than Common Article 3, by making the entire body of IHL relating to IACs applicable. They are a form of consent that reinforces an 'intention' or a 'disposition' of the High Contracting Party that has been pending since its accession to Additional Protocol I. The declaration is not self-sufficient, as are classic unilateral acts; rather it is programmed and has attributed legal effects. It can be assimilated to an 'acte-condition'. 82 (i.e. a means of obtaining access to existing provisions) rather than to a crucible of substantive rules.
The fact that armed groups have had little say in forming the rules of international law has had at least one effect in terms of international responsibility. The doctrine makes a distinction between primary rules and secondary rules. The former lay the foundations for conduct, while the latter govern the consequences of violations of the former. Primary rules and secondary rules are expressions used between states. They can, in theory, also be used when an armed group is involved in a situation. However, given that in general the sources of law are drafted by states, with regard to armed groups the primary rules can be said to be those imposed on the armed group, and the secondary rules those governing the consequences of violations of the rules imposed. The imposition of rules does not mean that the party on which they are imposed does not have rights thereunder, but simply that it has usually not had a voice in their construction. Since armed groups have rights in international law, logically any violation of those rights implies an obligation of reparation towards the armed group. 83 This can be termed 'received responsibility'. Conversely, an armed group violating rights can be expected to make reparation. This can be termed 'responsibility owed'. This follows logically from the application of the law, and would normally be expected in all situations in which armed groups are active but is more credible in situations in which the armed group is a major player -that is, it has existed over an extended period, it has effective and prolonged control over a part of a state's territory, and it has an almost quasi-state dimension (in particular NLMs). Armed groups have no sovereignty (over territory, resources, or other aspects) that might have been violated, and no citizens. They appear to have no internal affairs that can be interfered with. Their weight in fact or in law (for NLMs) could be a deciding factor when it comes to the existence of responsibility, especially 'responsibility owed'. Indeed, it would be difficult to speak, for example, of reparation for an insignificant armed group, even if, in theory, such reparation was due. In short, armed groups are not supposed to exist, and their de facto existence does not always make up for their de jure non-existence, especially when they are owed something. IHL may have qualified the struggles of NLMs as IACs; nevertheless, it has not done away with the differences between such movements and government forces. This brings us to a shortcoming or defect in the status conferred on armed groups under IHL. Armed conflicts involving NLMs are not conducted in the same conditions as classic IACs. In the latter case, the conflict is between states. Starting with Additional Protocol I, the treaties of IHL on IACs apply in conflicts between a state and a people 84 represented by an NLM. But a people is neither a state nor a liberation movement. The legal tie binding the state to its citizens -nationalitydoes not exist with respect to the NLM, which, moreover, does not have its own territory. As a result, the responses provided in IHL for the treatment of nationals of the other party to the conflict, occupation, or invasion (such as levées en masse) are legally inoperative here. In addition, the national liberation movement may be fighting for the people, but the people are not the movement. Thus, the movement is no different from any other armed group; its members pose the same problems of definition as the members of armed groups. As for any armed group (in respect of the population in the area where it is present), it cannot be said that the entire people represented by the movement 85 has membership in the armed group. For example, there have been cases in which persons belonging to the peoples in conflict have joined the enemy. 86 In addition, the guerrilla tactics often used by NLMs are simply a method of combat (which government forces also sometimes use). They create a symbiosis, or give an impression of symbiosis, between the movement and the population, but that does not make every individual in the population a member of the movement. 87 We can therefore say that members of NLMs, to which the ICRC, in its guidelines on direct participation in hostilities, pays scant attention, are defined in the same way as the members of armed groups in general. Because domestic law does not define what constitutes the member of an armed group, not even in the case of an NLM, contrary to most members of government armed forces, it is best not to use it as an example of the means of identifying such members. This view is not in line with existing law, and the status of members of an NLM should be determined on the same basis as that of members of government armed forces. This argument may strike the reader as strange, but it is not as outlandish as it might seem. The ICRC guidelines on participation in hostilities claim that membership in irregular state armed forces, such as militias and volunteer or paramilitary groups, is generally not regulated by domestic law and can only be reliably determined on the basis of the same functional criteria that apply to organized armed groups of non-state parties to the conflict. 88 Unless we maintain that NLMs have a functional internal law that clearly defines their members (easily achieved for a major movement that already manages a territory), it is tempting to declare that their members will also be identified using a functional criterion. Again, the argument steps back from the letter of current law. That being said, an individual taking up arms as a member of an NLM is a combatant in the eyes of the law, but that denomination is not attributed to those who fight as members of ordinary armed groups. 89
Deprivation of liberty
General considerations
In NIACs, domestic legislation is in direct competition with international law. Such conflicts are internal situations in which internal law is applicable but which are for the most part regulated by international law. Because the 'law' is internal, it is on the side of the government troops, who -unlike the armed groups violating the domestic order -draw their authority from the government lawfully or legitimately holding power over the territory. However, to distinguish between what government forces and armed groups can do is to undermine the spirit of IHL, which is based on the principle of equal treatment of the belligerents. 90 Our aim is not to defend that point of view, but rather to use it as a starting point to bring clarity to the discussion. In the IHL of IACs, owing to the mere fact that there is a conflict, regardless of any international crimes that may be committed, deprivation of liberty (of prisoners of war and civilian internees) is not a punishment if punishment requires a prior fault. In the context of an NIAC, however, deprivation of liberty is often tantamount to punishment, in that it is the government that detains individuals on 88 the grounds that taking up arms is in itself an act leading to punishment. For persons in the hands of armed groups, the overriding fear is that they will be subject to private justice. 91 The unstructured nature of recent NIACs, which have seen the concept of the group and its characteristics (such as its organized, disciplined, and hierarchical nature) crumble, has resulted in the extreme subjectivization of the rules governing deprivation of liberty. The question whether it is lawful to detain someone is grounded in the very 'right' of the parties to an armed conflict to deprive anyone of liberty, especially during an NIAC. It arises before the issue of the capture itself and the implementation of a detention regime. IHL is silent on this point, and we shall endeavour to explain why. Any discussion of lawfulness would no doubt have resulted in blockages: it is theoretically difficult to have states accept the idea that armed groups can act lawfully after having taken up arms. Furthermore, raising the point might well call into question the theoretical equality of the parties to the conflict under IHL, on the one hand, and result in a move away from what is essential -ensuring that persons deprived of their liberty are treated properly -on the other. By skirting the debate on lawfulness, IHL is acting out of a sense of legal pragmatism, taking account only of the inevitable de facto or even preferable situation: 92 the state of deprivation of liberty. The people in the hands of the parties to a conflict benefit from the rules of protection, no matter which party holds them. This is why the law stipulates, for example, that the expression 'those who are responsible for the internment or the detention' 93 relates to persons who are de facto responsible for camps, prisons, or any other places of detention, independently of any recognized legal authority. 94 In keeping with this pragmatic point of view, and in order to ensure that the parties to the conflict remain equal before the law, even if they are less concerned here than the persons being detained, IHL makes a number of weighty assumptions. We can start with the following example. When IHL provides that the death penalty is not to be pronounced on children who were under the age of 18 years at the time of an offence for which they have been convicted, 95 or on pregnant women or mothers of young children, even if they have been sentenced to death for offences related to the conflict, 96 it considers from the outset that even armed groups can try people and sentence them to death. Then there is the rule stipulating that no sentence is to be passed and no penalty executed on a person found guilty of an 91 It being understood that the parties to an NIAC can nonetheless decide to apply the rules of IHL applicable to persons deprived of their freedom in IACs. 92 Preferable, for example, to the elimination pure and simple of persons who should be detained, in keeping with either a 'take-no-prisoners' attitude or another attitude dictated by the circumstances. 93 The expression used in Additional Protocol II, Art. 5, para. 2. 94 'In fact, some experts have argued that it is unlikely that a court could be 'regularly constituted' under national law by an insurgent party. Bearing these remarks in mind, the ICRC proposed an equivalent formula 'which was accepted without opposition'. See Yves Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann offence related to an armed conflict 97 except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality both for the initial trial and for the appeal. Through this rule, IHL turns a blind eye to the institutional, legal, and judicial shortcomings of armed groups. Additional Protocol II speaks of a 'court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality'. Common Article 3, for its part, requires a 'regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples'. 98 Implementation of these provisions, cited here as examples, is contingent on means that armed groups usually do not have (legal and judicial means, not to mention territorial control 99 ). The pragmatism of IHL leaves hope for a satisfactory result without being overly concerned about the means used to achieve that result.
The right to deprive of liberty
Despite the efforts made to regulate all aspects of NIACs by means of international law, the fact is that such conflicts remain subject to the internal law of the state. Under that law, the members of armed groups are individuals punishable for the mere fact of having taken up arms. Even if they are not qualified as bandits, terrorists, renegades, or traitors, they are not considered as equal to the members of the government armed forces (whose operations are covered by the law). The government, in internal law, is the authority controlling the apparatus that limits or denies the liberty of persons on the territory for valid reasons. The government armed forces can, with the government's blessing, be a part of that apparatus with respect to the members of armed groups.
For its part, international law does not pull in the opposite direction. IHL is silent on the subject 100 -in itself an indication that government armed forces have the right to detain people. Indeed, humanitarian law not only accepts the fact of established deprivation of liberty, it also does not oblige the government in power to release persons detained for reasons relating to the conflict once the conflict has ended 101 (at least not in principle 102 ), whereas the ICRC proposal for Protocol II are applied to deprivation of liberty, the armed group should be of some consequence, given that the Protocol itself stipulates that it applies only in intense NIACs. 100 For an identical but more nuanced position (because it refers rather to a lack of clarity), see Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, 'The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts', in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, 2008, p. 618. 101 Article 6 of Additional Protocol II, in particular paragraph 5, stipulates no obligation but requires the authorities to endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty. 102 The ICRC study on customary law claims that persons deprived of their liberty in relation to an NIAC must be released as soon as the reasons for their detention cease to exist. It nevertheless goes on to say that the persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings are pending against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Additional Protocol II stipulated the obligation of release at the end of the armed conflict. 103 General international law, underpinned by the spirit of neutrality in principle in NIACs, does not affect the right of the government of a state to detain someone. But that right is inferred from the cardinal principle of public international law, which is state sovereignty, more specifically territorial and individual sovereignty. Unlike government forces, which have domestic law on their side, benefit from recognition under international law, through the government, and have the right to deprive people of their liberty on the national territory (for valid reasons), armed groups, in particular when it comes to restricting liberty, function on the fringes of the law. There is in principle nothing that gives individuals the right to detain people representing the public authority (members of the government armed forces), or people belonging to other private groups (members of enemy armed groups), or people not participating in the conflict, for security reasons (since the concept of security is related here to peace within the state, which the armed groups do not represent). When it comes to deprivation of liberty, armed groups have only the obligation to protect the persons whom they actually hold. They do not even have the right to remove from active hostilities a person belonging to the enemy camp.
Without actually saying so, IHL hints at two exceptions to the above. These are cases in which the parties concerned agree to the application in the conflict of the IHL of IACs. 104 That possibility gives the NIAC the legal appearance of an IAC in which the parties have the right to deprive of their liberty the members of the enemy armed forces and to release them without charge at the end of the conflict. Thus, by the mutual consent of the parties to the conflict, the armed group is also given the right to deprive persons of liberty. It is furthermore said, and therein lies the second exception, that 'once the fighting reaches a certain magnitude and the insurgent armed forces meet the criteria specified in Article 4A(2), 105 the spirit of Article 3 certainly requires that members of the insurgent forces should not be treated as common criminals'. 106 If the members of armed groups can obtain prisoner-of-war status and everything inherent in it, then by application of the principle of reciprocity, they must conduct themselves as though they were holding prisoners of war who are enemy troops. There is a certain logic to this. However, the validity of the initial statement remains in doubt. Does the fact that the insurgents have abided by the conditions set out in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention automatically give them prisoner-of-war status? There is no treaty provision allowing us to assert this. What is more, it is highly optimistic to state that the parties to the conflict will change the status of those whom they capture without an agreement, whether tacit or express. On the other hand, such a change of status may be dictated by the fear of unfavourable reciprocal treatment of their own members by the enemy.
The right to deprive of liberty without a trial
At the risk of repeating ourselves, positive IHL is a set of humanitarian rules that 'does not limit in any way a State's essential right to suppress an insurrection' 107 and leaves intact 'its powers of trial and sentence . . . its right to appraise aggravating or attenuating circumstances'. 108 In fact, there is in the theory of this body of law no obligation to try persons deprived of their liberty. IHL is not interested in the reasons for the detention, in the grounds or validity for depriving someone of liberty; it is content to require a regularly constituted tribunal or a tribunal offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality for prosecution, sentencing, and execution with respect to criminal offences relating to the armed conflict. 109 This single requirement has, in theory, at least the following implication. The members of the armed group have, as a minimum, committed acts that are reprehensible under domestic law by the mere fact of belonging to the group (rebellion, killings, criminal conspiracy, etc.). Those who have been deprived of their liberty (in connection with the armed conflict) are theoretically not entitled to a tribunal with the requisite qualities (a sort of right to a judge) on the basis of IHL alone. In an anti-humanitarian spirit, it simply suffices to start no proceedings against the members of the armed group for them to continue to be deprived of their liberty in the absence of any obligation to bring them before a judge. They will nevertheless have to be released as soon as the reasons for which they were detained cease to exist, meaning at the latest at the end of the armed conflict, according to what is said to be a customary rule. 110 If the government intends to prolong their detention, it is obliged to prosecute them. Indeed, those against whom criminal proceedings are pending or those lawfully convicted and serving a sentence may continue to be detained beyond the end of the armed conflict 111 if it is the pre-existing government that won the day. 112 This would appear to be the theory in IHL. The law thus appears to be fairly permissive in prohibiting only 'summary justice'. 113 In short, as concerns the subject at hand, IHL seems to depend more on the ability to qualify the various situations being governed. This is due to the absence of a clear stance on the issue, the purely humanitarian nature of this branch of the law, and states' decision not to encroach on their 'domaine reservé'. However, the ICRC study on customary law claims that arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited in both IACs and NIACs. 114 If any distinction can be made between the practice of IHL and that of human rights, the prohibition would seem to be based more on state human rights practice than on IHL. In all events, the study, which details state practice as 'recorded' in military manuals, gives wide resonance to a practice based on human rights law (international human rights texts, domestic laws that were also the first texts in history to enshrine human rights). It can be said that beyond the prohibition of 'summary justice', which is covered by IHL, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty tends to be a matter of human rights law. 115 Human rights law contains rules of relevance to the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and the ICRC study tends to refer to them 116 without necessarily being clear as to the nature (human rights law or humanitarian law) of the rule concerned.
To put it more clearly, the IHL of IACs and human rights law contain various rules on the subject. The question is whether these rules can be called into play, and which one in particular. First, however, let us consider what each body contains in the way of rules. The rules of the former relate in particular to resident civilians who are citizens of the enemy state and to civilians in occupied territories. Civilians who are citizens of the enemy state, for example, can only be interned if the security of the power in whose hands the civilians find themselves makes it absolutely necessary to do so. 117 Additional Protocol I requires that the persons concerned be informed without delay, in a language that they understand, of the reasons why that measure has been taken. 118 A court or administrative board must consider the decision to intern each person concerned as soon as possible, and, if the internment is maintained, reconsider it periodically (every six months). The Protecting Power must be notified of any major decisions relating to the internment, 119 which must end with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the internment have ceased to exist. 120 112 If the armed group is victorious, it seems unlikely that any of its members will continue to be detained. 113 R. Prisoners of war, for their part, may see their detention prolonged with no particular procedure being undertaken until the end of active hostilities, 121 unless they are released earlier for health reasons 122 or on other grounds, such as the good will of the Detaining Power. 123 Human rights law, for its part, provides that the deprivation of liberty must be lawful. In this regard, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a universal treaty, sets forth the general idea according to which every individual has the right to liberty and security of person. Arbitrary arrest and detention are therefore prohibited; no one may be deprived of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. Anyone who is arrested must be informed, at the time of the arrest, of the reasons for it, and promptly informed of any charges against them. Anyone deprived of liberty on a criminal charge must be brought promptly before a judge, and must be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention is entitled to compensation. 124 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, a regional treaty, also stipulates that every individual has the right to liberty and to security of person, and that no one may be deprived of their liberty except for reasons and on conditions previously laid down by law. 125 In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 126 Other We shall now turn to the use of rules other than those of the IHL of NIACs pertaining to the question of the lawfulness of depriving someone of their liberty. We shall generally limit our discussion, with regard to human rights law, to the universal binding rules of the ICCPR; the African Charter is considered only secondarily.
The IHL of IACs is less detailed than human rights law, but the latter is weakened by the absence of specific deadlines (for appeals, for example) and by the fact that it allows derogations. As concerns the possibility to derogate from human rights law, NIACs are accepted, 131 almost without demur, 132 as one of the worst situations imperilling the very existence of a nation. In the context of such a conflict, the government authorities can therefore decide to derogate from human rights law except for rights with respect to which there may be no derogation (the hard core). Article 4 of the ICCPR does not classify the rights cited above (from the Covenant) as rights from which there may be no derogation. The African Charter does not, for its part, contain a hard core of human rights, at least not expressly. 133 It has been pointed out that, logically, by remaining silent, the African states intended to avoid a new treaty-based rule on the subject while reserving the right to invoke the rule existing in general international law. 134 Thus, if treaty-based law is strictly construed, the entire question of the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty could be the object of a derogation on the part of the government authorities in a NIAC. People could be detained without regard for the specific grounds required for such a measure, and would be unable to contest the decision to detain them before a judge.
Does the right to derogate from human rights rules on the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty exist outside the treaties? According to the Human Rights Committee, the list set out in Article 4 of the ICCPR is not exhaustive. It holds that the category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list of non-derogable provisions as given in Article 4, paragraph 2. States parties may in no circumstances invoke Article 4 of the ICCPR as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty, or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of promptly before a judicial authority, having the right to defend themselves or to be assisted by legal counsel, preferably of their own choice. innocence. 135 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is not universal, adopted more or less the same position in its advisory opinion of 30 January 1987, when it ruled that the clause of derogation did not authorize the suspension of the requisite judicial guarantees, such as habeas corpus. 136 Thus, although under the letter of the law Article 9 of the ICCPR may be subject to derogation in some cases, in practice it would seem that its scope as an article from which derogations are permitted is limited (in particular with regard to habeas corpus). This corrected aspect of human rights, added to the fact that its provisions are fairly detailed (except for the above-mentioned absence of a deadline, contrary to IHL), is an argument in favour of the application of human rights rules as lex specialis in terms of the law of IACs. There is also an argument against the use by analogy of the provisions of the law of IACs. The main conventions on the two types of conflict (international and non-international) having been negotiated during the same periods of time, if states had wanted there to be a similarity in the provisions on the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty, it would have sufficed for them to 'transpose' the relevant provisions in the case of NIACs, at least the provisions that had been watered down. Moreover -and this is another argument in favour of the application of human rights rules -human rights law applies at all times, both in international and non-international conflicts.
The above paragraphs suffice to show that the human rights of a member of an armed group in the hands of government forces, notably the right to be brought before a judge or a similar body, must be respected.
Would we reach a different conclusion if it were the armed group depriving someone of their liberty? The most logical reasoning is that, if the deprivation of liberty is groundless, it is not necessary to gauge whether armed groups can hold persons without trial. They must release the people whom they detain. We can take the discussion one step further, however, by abstracting in spirit and on the basis of the observation that there exists a de facto situation of deprivation of liberty. We can essentially transpose what we have already said with regard to deprivation of liberty by government forces. There is no reason for one of the parties to the conflict to be bound by the rules governing the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty and the other not, when jus in bello advocates the equality of the belligerents. In view of prior developments, the point is to ensure respect for human rights by armed groups detaining people. Given the private-entity nature of armed groups, various questions may arise with regard to the difficulty of applying human rights. 137 The first is general and relates to the armed group's submission to human rights law. Classic human rights doctrine maintains that human rights law is binding only on states, and that human rights standards cannot be applied to acts committed by private individuals or groups. 138 This position is gradually evolving, making it possible to evoke other difficulties. The second difficulty is practical in nature. It relates to the legitimate doubt about the availability of a court, substantive rules, or procedural law within the armed group. Armed groups that have lasted a certain time, that have had prolonged control over territory, and that intend to resemble a form of state can work to remove that doubt. In other cases, the doubt will subsist. Generally speaking, however, it will remain necessary to strive to interpret the concept of lawfulness.
Concluding remarks on deprivation of liberty
In the context of NIACs, the deprivation of liberty is one of the best fields for highlighting the inequality of the parties to the conflict in international law. That inequality can be felt in the two main branches of law relative to the subject: IHL and international human rights law.
And yet, when it comes to IHL, the starting point is that the belligerents are equal in law. 139 Were this not to be the case -were the law not, as a minimum, to raise the non-state party to the conflict to a certain rank -it would be utopian to hope for any compliance with humanitarian law. Here one speaks about equality in terms of rights and duties, and not in terms of the effect on status in general. 140 Deprivation of liberty is a field that tangibly restricts the extension of the scope of the law of IACs to armed conflicts that are non-international in character. It reflects, in short, the tendency to multiply both the rights and the obligations of parties to NIACs. By increasing the rights and obligations of both parties at the same time (in the interests of equality), the risk is that the armed group will be rendered incapable of discharging all its obligations. It can legitimately be asked, for example, whether it is wise to transpose all the rules of law on prisoners of war to persons deprived of liberty in NIACs. Do the armed groups operating in such situations have the means of applying all the rules relating to prisoners of war? The answer is no. Furthermore, IHL, despite its laudable intentions to humanize armed conflicts, does not ignore the need to maintain a certain difference between government troops and armed groups. Shielding the members of armed groups from any charges arising from the armed conflict -in the same way as prisoners of war are -is tantamount to legalizing armed action against the state authorities and, in principle, to granting those unhappy with the state the right to take up arms, a question on which IHL has opted to remain silent. It is therefore preferable for the scope of the law of IACs to be extended via the consent of the parties to the conflict. In fact, the reality of NIACs is that they are not entirely free of domestic law. Making certain aspects of such conflicts subject to international law (notably treatment of persons, in the narrow sense) does not affect the very essence of this type of conflict, which remains internal.
International human rights law, for its part, is not predicated on the principle of the belligerents' equality. It takes no account of armed groups, not even when dealing with the case of an NIAC. 141 In omitting armed groups, international human rights law does not promote the belligerents' equality. On the contrary, without actually saying so, it tips the scales in favour of armed groups in that it stipulates clear obligations only for government forces.
Conclusion
No armed group, whether it is an ordinary armed group or one rising up to emancipate a people, exists in international law on its mere say-so. It exists because, and especially in the light of, its ability to fundamentally challenge the established public order. An armed group exists at the earliest at the start of an armed conflict in which it has a stake. It is fleeting in nature compared to the state, and always seems to take international law by surprise. The law, in turn, remains aloof from the subject, especially since, in general, armed groups are not desired or wanted (unlike international organizations, for example, which have 'an international right'). Unlike other entities, such as the state and the international organizations, armed groups should not exist; in other words, their existence is not usual in international law. Armed groups are born to disturb order, in the physical and legal sense. Their de facto existence and the far reach of their actions in the modern world do not suffice to do away with the idea that there is something abnormal about their existence. The main obstacle is the state, which continues to dominate international law, even though it has been dealt practical setbacks, both peacefully (by individuals, civil society, various schools of thought and philosophy) and by violence (terrorists or armed groups). 141 The point is illustrated by the following example relating to deprivation of liberty: 'Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences. Exceptional circumstances including a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of such executions. Such executions shall not be carried out under any circumstances including, but not limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, excessive or illegal use of force by a public official or other person acting in an official capacity or by a person acting at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence of such person, and situations in which deaths occur in custody. This prohibition shall prevail over decrees issued by governmental authority'. 
